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         This special issue highlights the work of some recent participants of a series of Minimal Cognition 
workshops held at the University of Wollongong in 2018. The goal of these workshops has been to showcase 
the interdisciplinary work being done in what might be called ‘minimal cognition research.’ Our aim was, and 
continues to be, to bring biologists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and computer scientists into dialogue on 
how we might understand the minimal criteria for cognition and cognitive behavior. This special issue, titled 
“Approaching Minimal Cognition,” is intended to open up further exchange between the different fields 
converging on this richly interesting area of research, and to spur debate and discussion about the roots of 
cognition, the indicators of cognitive behavior, collective cognition, and the possibility of life-mind continuity. 
         The term “minimal cognition” came into popular use thanks to Randall Beer’s work on modelling 
what he referred to as minimally cognitive agents (1996, 1997, 2003; Beer and Williams 2015). As he says of this 
project: “The term ‘minimally cognitive behavior’ is meant to connote the simplest behavior that raises 
cognitively interesting issues” (Beer 1996). Elaborating on a relatively simple robot equipped with an eye, two 
motors, an arm, and a hand, Beer provides a preliminary list of such cognitively interesting behaviors. For 
instance, he tells us that a robot like this can organize its behavior in accordance with shapes of objects in the 
environment, navigate in two dimensional coordinates, observe object persistence, shift its attentional focus, 
and possibly even engage in cooperative tasks with other agents of the same kind (Beer 1996). Moreover, Beer 
used neural networks with a very simple neural architecture to show that very little was needed in the way of 
internal dynamics to produce behavior that might be otherwise presumed to involve information processing 
and the use of mental representations . According to him, the environment itself could do a lot of the work 
these kinds of entities tend to be posited to do (Beer 1996; Brooks 1991). Importantly, his intent was not so 
much to pinpoint what the minimal criteria for cognition might be, but to show how  the use of models could 
help illuminate philosophical and scientific debates on what cognition might (or might not) be. 
         Beer’s minimally cognitive agents are a paradigmatic example of a minimal model: a model that “most 
economically caricatures the essential” features of a system needed to generate the phenomena of interest 
(Goldenfield 1992, p.33). For those interested in minimal cognition specifically, though, what exactly the  
phenomena of interest are is not so clear. One might think of minimal cognition research as focused on finding 
an explanatory boundary --e.g., at what point do behaviors require a more complex explanation than pointing 
to chemical reactions and biological mechanisms? Or, we might think of minimal cognition research as looking 
to pinpoint the most fundamental components or capacities needed for an organism to exhibit some behavior 
we deem cognitively interesting (such as flexibility, memory, or adaptive learning). Alternatively, we might also 
think that discussions about minimal cognition are about approach—e.g., which tools (phylogenetic, 
behavioral, modelling) give us the best answers about the emergence of cognition?  
Interest in these kinds of questions, a growing literature on organisms such as bacteria, plants, and even 
slime moulds (see Döbereiner & Nakagaki, in press; Segundo-Ortin and Calvo, 2019), and current debates 
about the best framework for understanding cognition have led to a convergence of  interest on the level of 
complexity at which cognition arises. Take, for instance, the autopoietic approach, which posits cognition as 
continuous with the biodynamics of life itself (Varela 1979; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Autopoiesis, 
also referred to as “material self-production,” refers to the capacity of living systems to generate and maintain 
their own identity as something distinct from the environment. Varela argues that this process of self-
production is, fundamentally, already cognitive, for it requires the organism to be able to distinguish what in the 
environment is valuable and harmful to maintain its biological autonomy, regulating its interaction accordingly. 
In the words of Maturana and Varela, appealing to autopoiesis enables us to see that “[l]iving systems are 
cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition” (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 13). 
The autopoietic approach to cognition has generated some criticism. As van Duijn, Keijzer, and 
Franken (2006) argue, one reason that minimal cognition is controversial is that the cognitive processes 
associated with minimal cognition seem to be too closely associated with biological processes, especially on the 
autopoietic understanding. That is, while cognition is surely a biological process, if it does turn out that 
cognition and living go hand-and-hand, that doesn’t give us much purchase on what cognition is and how it is 
different from living, if at all. 
Instead, van Duijn et al. (2006) propose that the starting point for cognition ought to be placed at the 
capacity for sensorimotor coordination. To illustrate this, they compare the operation of the “lac operon” 
system and chemotaxis in E. coli. The lac operon system allows the bacterium to metabolize lactose, and it is 
disinhibited in the case that only lactose, rather than the system’s preferred energy source of glucose, is 
abundant in the bacterium’s environment. As they argue, this process can be explained as a chemical reaction 
within the metabolic process. In chemotaxis, however, the bacterium changes its position in the environment in 
response to chemical gradients, “which is relevant for changing metabolic opportunities, and in this way 
expanding the adaptive opportunities of [the organism] to a considerable degree” (van Duijn, Keijzer, and 
Franken 2006, p. 164). They argue that chemotaxis, but not the activity of the lac operon, demonstrates 
sensorimotor coordination,  and is thus a meta-metabolic, or second order, process. Sensorimotor coordination, 
they argue,  is a better starting point for cognition, for it “subsumes a basic metabolic/autopoietic network” 
(2006, p. 159). Additionally, they note, this kind of cognitive activity is not only necessarily “situated” in its 
environment, but “the sensorimotor interaction of the minimal cognizer is constitutive of the cognitive process 
itself” (2006, p. 165). 
However, it isn’t clear that the sensorimotor approach satisfies the criteria of those, such as Moreno and 
co-authors,  (Moreno et al. 1997, Barandiaran, 2017; Barandiaran and Moreno, 2006), who claim that cognition 
must be meta-metabolic to be differentiated from biological processes. Barandarian and Moreno argue that 
“minimal cognition requires more than cognitive-like behavior, that it requires a particular kind of dynamic 
organization that adaptively sustains a behavioral repertoire and, most importantly, a capacity to reorganize and 
generate new dynamic structures in order to preserve its organization” (Barandarian and Moreno 2006, p. 182). 
So, while we might find sensorimotor coordination (which would be cognitive-like behavior) in prokaryotes, it 
is in the ability to sustain an organism-specific behavioral repertoire and the ability to re-organize behaviors 
adaptively that we should think of cognition as arising. And this, they argue, is a capacity enabled by the 
presence of a nervous system.  
Biologists Müller, di Primio, and Lengeler, in defining minimal cognition, argue “that prokaryotes can 
well be described in cognitive terms and showed that some criteria normally believed to be crucial for cognitive 
phenomena in higher organisms apply to many phenomenon in prokaryotes” (2001, p. 93). Focusing on 
flexibility as a benchmark cognitive capacity, they have shown that prokaryotes exhibited a list of what they 
called minimal cognitive abilities (ex. modifiable stimulus-response pathway, memory, formation of 
expectation, adaptation, learning, etc.) that facilitated this flexibility. Interestingly, Pamela Lyon has recently 
shown that if we view cognition as the “capacity to flexibly generate complex behavior” (2017, p. 454) and look 
at the most recent research available on bacterial behaviors, then it shows that “different types of signalling 
systems clearly enable different degrees of response flexibility and behavioral complexity” (Ibid.) in order to 
cope with a more complex environment. Similar positions have been defended regarding plants (Calvo 2016; 
Segundo-Ortin and Calvo 2019). 
Using an evolutionary approach, Peter-Godfrey Smith (2002) argues that cognition is on a continuum 
with, or “shades off” into, more basic biological processes such as metabolism. His environmental complexity 
thesis (ECT) holds that cognition is not rooted in basic biological processes, but evolved from these processes as 
a way for organisms to deal with increasing environmental complexity--i.e.,  predation. While Godfrey-Smith 
proposes no specific boundary, the level of environmental complexity, and associated navigational and 
interactive behaviors necessary for survival seems to place the evolution of cognition above the bacterial level 
(though he does refer to the possibility of bacteria having a kind of ‘proto-cognition’ (Godfrey-Smith 2002, 
2016b), a notion which comes under some critical scrutiny from Pamela Lyon (this issue). 
 As said at the beginning, this special issue (and the workshops that preceded it) aimed to showcase part 
of the relevant work being done in these discussions. Given the multitude of approaches and kinds of criteria 
that researchers on minimal cognition are using, it is unlikely that we will see any consensus soon on what it is 
exactly, let alone where it emerges. In the meantime, the interdisciplinary aspects of minimal cognition research 
will be important for developing new and more precise terminology, for generating more empirical data, for 
developing new models, and for inspiring new philosophical questions about the fundamental nature of 
cognition and its emergence. Our hope is that the contributions here will help shed light on some of the 
controversies just highlighted, and that they will open the way for subsequent work, both in philosophy and the 
sciences. 
 Pamela Lyon’s paper “Of what is ‘minimal cognition’ the half-baked version?” takes a critical 
approach to the term, distinguishing between different usages through an extensive review of the history and 
contemporary appearances of the term and then taking aim at what she calls the “ontological usage.” Her 
concern is the carving out of an ontological category of minimal cognition as though this is set apart from a 
more fully-fledged notion of cognition, noting that this approach is unique to the cognitive sciences (in contrast 
to the life sciences). She points to uses of notions such as “proto-cognition” (Godfrey-Smith, 2002a, 2002b) as 
paradigmatic of this kind of usage, as they seem to point to something prior to cognition on a scale of evolution 
or complexity. Rather, Lyon urges us to recognize cognition (without an ontological qualifier) as a necessary 
function for living. Offering a detailed analysis of the intent behind the most frequent appearances of the term 
and a case study involving cognitive functions in protein signal transduction networks for several types of 
bacteria, Lyon proposes an inclusive definition of cognition intended to provide a starting point for a 
functional/mechanistic investigation of cognition in basal organisms. 
         In their contribution, Felix Woolford and Matthew Egbert take an approach more in line with the 
initial explorations of minimally interesting cognitive behaviors pioneered by Beer (1996, 1997, 2003). Using an 
organizational (Varela 1979) rather than a functional approach, Woolford and Egbert employ a simplified 
IDSM (Iterant Deformable Sensorimotor Medium) controller to investigate self-sustaining sensorimotor 
behaviors, which they call a NB-SMM (Node-Based SensoriMotor Map). In this model, the nodes denote a 
pattern of response to environmental features. Parameters of the nodes of one and two node systems were varied 
to investigate the resulting senrorimotor dynamics between robot and environment. Their results, they argue, 
demonstrate that the behavioral variety arises from the constraints (assigned parameters) of the embodied robot-
environment interaction. They surmise that there would be an increase in behavioral complexity not only 
through the addition of more nodes, but also if the robot were given a dynamic environment—demonstrating 
that even a minimal sensorimotor-to-motor map can produce cognitively interesting behaviors that a functional 
analysis might be inadequate to explain. 
Patrick McGivern’s contribution examines the suggestion that simple physical systems can serve as 
minimal models for cognitive behaviors. While most work on minimal cognition focuses on behaviors found in 
living systems, many of the same types of behavior can also be found in non-living systems. For example, Lagzi 
et al. (2010) describe maze-solving behavior in chemotactic oil-drops, where simple oil drops are able to find the 
shortest path through a maze given an appropriate chemical gradient. Similar behaviors involving autonomous 
motion and environmental sensitivity are often cited as paradigmatic cases of minimal cognition when they 
occur in living. Drawing on recent discussions of minimal models in physics, McGivern considers the 
suggestion that these cases  should be viewed as minimal models of cognition. He argues that the concept of a 
minimal model carries with it significant implications concerning the nature of  the behavior being modelled 
and the constraints that systems exhibiting that behavior must satisfy. One consequence of this is that the claim 
that a non-living system is a minimal model of cognition is more difficult to establish that we might expect: 
there is more to being a minimal model than just its simplicity. Another consequence is that it is difficult to 
justify a distinction between living systems as genuinely cognitive and non-living systems as ‘mere models’. 
McGivern suggests that the domain of minimal cognition should be understood very broadly, rather than being 
restricted to the domain of living things. 
         The contribution of Lachlan Walmsley also explores the implications of modelling in minimal 
cognition, though in this case modelling of the slime mould Physarum polycephalum is used to show the 
compatibility between mechanistic models and enactive approaches to cognition. Enactive approaches consider 
cognition to be constituted in the relationship between an organism and their environment, rather than the 
more standard cognitivist view of cognition as the processing of representations. Walmsley argues that the 
branch known as Radical Enactivism (REC) (Hutto and Myin 2017) in particular adheres to an explanatory 
monism, accepting only dynamical explanations, when it ought to be adopting an explanatory pluralism about 
cognition. Instead of rejecting mechanistic models outright, Walmsley provides evidence through a description 
of the modeling of slime moulds for what mechanistic models can offer for radical enactive explanations of 
cognition, without it being necessary for enactivists to adhere to the primacy or fundamentality of mechanistic 
explanation (as advocated for by new mechanists).  
Jules Smith-Ferguson and Madeleine Beekman also look at the slime mould Physarum 
polycephalum. In their paper, Smith-Ferguson and Beekam use P. polycephalum as a case study for exploring 
minimally cognitive capacities through the lens and methods of behavioral ecology. In particular, they discuss 
evidence for memory, habituation, and irrational decision-making in P. polycephalum, in this case to better 
understand the emergence and evolution of information processing mechanisms across phyla. This empirical 
focus is combined with a defense of the so-called “biogenic” approach to cognition (Lyon, 2006). This is an 
inherently evolutionary approach that conceives of cognitive capacities as phylogenetic traits evolved to enhance 
the organism’s capacity to adapt to their environment. Adopting this approach, they contend, can help 
illuminate questions such as why an organism x has some specific cognitive capacity while other organisms do 
not. For example, in light with the empirical evidence concerning learning in P. polycephalum, Smith-Ferguson 
and Beekam hypothesize that even though non-associative learning (habituation and sensitisation) is essential 
for P. polycephalum, it might have other mechanisms that make the evolution of more complex forms of 
learning (associative learning, non-elemental discrimination, and so on) unnecessary.  
Sidney Carls-Diamante’s paper takes issue with chemical self-recognition in octopuses, examining 
how it connects to debates about minimal cognition in different organisms. Self-recognition is broadly 
understood here as “the capacity of an organism to identify its body and body parts as its own and not of a 
conspecific or another entity” (p. 2). Chemical self-recognition is a well-known phenomenon in other species 
(e.g., urine sniffing in dogs), and consists of determining whether the phenotypic signals contained in a specific 
chemical stimulus belong to the organism itself, to a conspecific, or to another organism or entity.  Based on 
empirical finding regarding the inhibition of sucker responses when presented with octopus skin, Carls-
Diamante provides an account of how chemoreceptive mechanisms in the peripheral nervous system of 
octopuses may contribute to the system’s overall capacity for self-recognition. After this, the author offers 
reason as to why this form of self-recognition should be considered a middle ground between a purely reactive, 
non-cognitive activity, and a sophisticated, representation-based, cognitive capacity.  
As the papers included in this special issue show, the research about minimal cognition has been 
growing consistently and surprisingly fast in recent years, attracting the attention of philosophers and scientists 
alike. We believe this special issue can contribute to enrich the current state of arts, and that it will become a 
useful source for information for those interested in investigating where, how, and why cognition starts.  
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